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ABSTRACT
Lawyers have long been inspired by the advocacy work of Martin
Luther King, Jr. From his work on the Montgomery bus boycott, to lunch
counter sit-ins, to his March on Washington, Dr. King demonstrated skilled
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advocacy that resulted in important legal advancements. While lawyers
give primacy to Dr. King as an advocate, Dr. King gave primacy to his
work as a preacher. This article challenges the legal profession to consider
the ways in which Dr. King, the preacher, may be as inspirational and
instructive as Dr. King, the civil rights icon. Just as Dr. King's religious
values were not abstracted from their context, but rather gave life to a
seemingly intractable contemporary problem of values clashing with law,
so too can lawyers deploy contextualized religious values consistent with
their professional obligations and roles. The article explores Dr. King's
essential concept, love in action, which he derived from his own Christian
faith, and considers its corollaries in two other faith traditions, Judaism and
Buddhism. The article then applies love in action in two typical lawyering
situations - an initial client meeting and a settlement offer, and concludes
that the preacher-like call of Dr. King for love in action can inspire lawyers
as powerfully and appropriately as the calls to action of the advocate Dr.
King.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along the way of life, someone must have sense enough and morality
enough to cut off the chain of hate and evil. The greatest way to do
that is through love. I believe firmly that love is a transforming power
that can lift a whole community to new horizons of fair play, goodwill,
and justice.2
For many lawyers, Martin Luther King, Jr. is a powerful symbol. His
life inspires lawyers to believe in the possibility of monumental legal
change through community mobilization; consider his work on the
Montgomery bus boycott.3 His oratory inspires lawyers to believe in the
possibility of monumental legal change through persuasion; consider how
often Dr. King's I Have a Dream speech is quoted.4 Lawyers use Dr.
King's speeches and sayings as a way of calling forth a narrative about how
legal structures (among others) in this country were made to acknowledge a
2. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 63
(Clayborne Carson ed., Grand Central Publishing 1998) [hereinafter AMLK].
3. See id. at 50-53. The Montgomery bus boycott came after Rosa Parks refused to give up
her bus seat to a white man. See id. It ended almost a year later when the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a special three-judge district court order declaring Alabama's bus segregation
laws unconstitutional. See id. at 93.
4. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217 (James Melvin Washington ed., HarperCollins
Publishers 1991) (1986) [hereinafter TOH] (emphasis added); see, e.g., DAVID A. BOBBITT, THE
RHETORIC OF REDEMPTION: KENNETH BURKE'S REDEMPTION DRAMA AND MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR.'S "I HAVE A DREAM" SPEECH ix (Robert E. Denton, Jr. ed., Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 2004).
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more legitimate sense of equality.5 Lawyers also look to Dr. King as a
model advocate - a zealous and loyal representative of his underserved and
underrepresented community.6
Dr. King, himself, recognized the importance of persuasion by
lawyers. In his autobiography, he recounts his arrest in 1960, as the lunch
counter sit-in movement intensified, for falsifying state income tax returns.
7
He was defended by William Ming and Huber Delaney - two African-
American lawyers from the North.8 Dr. King knew the criminal charges
were illegitimate and an attempt by the "white Southern power structure" to
derail his civil rights work.9 About the efforts of his lawyers, Dr. King
recalled:
They [Ming and Delaney] brought to the courtroom wisdom, courage,
and a highly developed art of advocacy... I am frank to confess that
on this occasion I learned that truth and conviction in the hands of a
skillful advocate could make what started out as a bigoted, prejudiced
jury, choose the path ofjustice. 10
Dr. King was acquitted." Dr. King, the advocate, knew the power of
persuasion, not only by his own work, but also by the work of lawyers
around him.
For lawyers, then, looking at Martin Luther King, Jr. - in particular,
Dr. King the advocate - his portrait fits smoothly into the contours of what
many of us would expect of a socially-activist lawyer. Thus, it is easy for
us to look to Dr. King as a model for what socially-engaged lawyering
might look like. How might that model change if we consider Dr. King not
in an advocacy role, but in his role as a preacher?
King gave primacy to his role as a preacher. As he said upon his
installation in 1954 as minister at the Dexter Avenue Church in
Montgomery: "I come to you with only the claim of being a servant of
Christ, and a feeling of dependence on his grace for my leadership. I come
5. See Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument Via The Letter From a
Birmingham City Jail, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 130, 132-33 (2009), available at
http://www.law2.byu.edu/law libraryjlwi/archivesl2009_1 .htm; see also AMLK, supra note 2, at
226 ("1 have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its
creed-we hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal.").
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html (demonstrating these are the same qualities called
on from lawyers under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
7. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 135, 144-45.
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with a feeling that I have been called to preach and to lead God's people."' 2
Similarly, after the first day of the Montgomery bus boycott, for which
organizers had hoped for 60% participation, and which had garnered almost
100% participation of the Black community, 3 Dr. King was asked to speak
to the community gathered that night at Holt Street Church. 4 With little
time to draft his remarks, Dr. King spoke without notes, proclaiming his
now well-known statement: "And we are not wrong. We are not wrong in
what we are doing. If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is
wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If
we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong."' 5 King's remarks had "evoked
more response than any speech or sermon [he] had ever delivered, and yet
it was virtually unprepared.' 6 King credited his ability so strongly to
evoke and capture the sentiment that night not to his commitment to civil
rights or his capacity as an orator, but to his calling as a preacher. 7
If for Dr. King, then, his ministry was the primary wellspring for the
way in which he approached his advocacy, what did that mean for Dr.
King? Further, what does it mean for lawyers today who look to Dr. King
as an inspirational model for their own lawyerly advocacy? As the opening
quote of this article makes clear," Dr. King relied on the principle of love
and its resulting requirement of nonviolence. Acknowledging that love and
nonviolence might be challenging commitments to be asked from the
greater Black community, Dr. King took great care in delineating what he
meant by love. 19 He articulated many times that his theory of love
is not a weak, passive love. It is love in action .... [It] is love seeking
to preserve and create community. It is insistence on community even
when one seeks to break it .... In the final analysis, agape [Greek for
love] means a recognition of the fact that all life is interrelated. All
humanity is involved in a single process, and all men are brothers.2°
Dr. King believed that his practice based on love in action could bring
about legal change, just as it could bring about social change. 2' He saw the
12. Id. at 46.
13. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 55.
14. See id. at 59.
15. Id. at 58-60.
16. Id. at61.
17. See id.
18. See supra Abstract.
19. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 67-68. For example, in his autobiography, Dr. King
recounts that during the Montgomery bus boycott he was challenged about the wisdom of
building a campaign based on love and nonviolence. See id.
20. TOH, supra note 4, at 20.
21. See id.; see also STEWART BURNS, To THE MOUNTAINTOP: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.'S
SACRED MISSION TO SAVE AMERICA 1955-1968 93-94, 126-27 (Harper San Francisco 2004).
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bus segregation law change in Montgomery. He saw the change in lunch
counter segregation in Birmingham. 23 He saw the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.24 He also saw and experienced innumerable ways in
which the law may be used illegitimately: a Montgomery jury refusing to
convict seven white defendants on charges related to bombings,25 his
myriad arrests designed to curtail his advocacy, 26 and injunctions entered to
stop lunch counter sit-ins. 27 Dr. King, the preacher, was called by his faith
to commit to love in action, and Dr. King, the advocate, demonstrated its
power to effect legal and social change.
Fast forward forty-five years to contemporary time. Imagine an
annual meeting of the Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar
Association - a group whose membership is comprised of lawyers 36 years
or younger, or who have practiced five years or less. 2 To the assembled
group of lawyers, almost all of whom were born after Dr. King was
assassinated, the keynote speaker talks about his hopes for the ways in
which the young lawyers will practice law. The speaker counsels, "[Love]
says you must go on with wise restraint and calm reasonableness but you
must keep moving., 29 After acknowledging that the law can be a way in
which society permits a kind of violence to be played out between
individuals, entities, communities, and governments," the speaker then
further counsels, ". . . nonviolence in the truest sense is not a strategy that
one uses simply because it is expedient at the moment; nonviolence is
ultimately a way of life that men live by because of the sheer morality of its
claim."31 How would such a speech be responded to by the assembled
young lawyers? Could those young lawyers embrace the message of Dr.
King, the preacher, in the same way they might be willing to embrace Dr.
King, the iconic civil rights advocate?
This article takes up those questions. In Part II, it sketches the
contours of the historic tension in the legal profession between a perceived
set of professional values and other value sets, particularly those based on
22. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 214.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 242.
25. See id. at 103-04.
26. See id. at 145-47 (providing Dr. King's arrest in 1960 during a sit-in in Atlanta as an
example).
27. See id. at 180-81.
28. See Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association,
http://www.abanet.org/yld/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
29. TOH, supra note 4, at 14.
30. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale. L.J. 1601 passim (1986).
31. TOH, supra note 4, at 17.
[Vol. 22
CONTEMPORARY LESSONS ON LA WYERLYADVOCACY
religion.32 Using the life of Dr. King and his theory of love in action, the
article then argues that to understand the advocacy lessons of Dr. King,33
the preacher, lawyers must set aside any generalized discomfort about
religious values, and must instead look to particularized values and the
effect on legal advocacy of those values in action.34 Understanding Dr.
King's theory of love in action to consider not just relationships between
individuals, but also relationships between strangers or between estranged
communities, the article considers Dr. King's love in action as a variation
of the Biblical commandment of love of neighbor. 35  The article assesses
whether the actions required by love of neighbor are consistent with actions
required by legal professional values.36 The article then makes a further
unique contribution by considering love of neighbor across multiple faith
traditions - Christian, Jewish, and Buddhist.37 The article concludes
lawyers should be as inspired by Dr. King, the preacher, as they are by Dr.
King, the extraordinary orator and creator of legal change.38  The
preacher's call for love in action provides a set of advocacy skills deeply
consistent with, and encouraging of, the ways in which the profession calls
on, and inspires, its lawyers to practice.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF REFLECTION
In order to consider the possibility of lawyers being inspired by Dr.
King's call for love in action, one must first acknowledge the legal
profession's unease with religious values. 39  That unease is not new, and
legal scholars have reflected on the place of faith in lawyering for some
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. See infra Part H.C. Dr. King's theory of love in action has a parallel in legal theory
pioneered by Stewart Macaulay. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 1, 1 (1963), available at
http://www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/macaulay/papers/non-contractual.pdf. In 1963, Macaulay
published a seminal work in which he introduced the theory of law in action as it related to
business contracts. See id. at 5-19. Macaulay uncovered the ways in which business members
relied on their relationships with each other to determine and interpret what they expected from
contract law. See id. at 6-12. Just as King expected the law to respond to changes in
relationships between communities, so too business members expect formal contract law to give
way to the demands of their relationships. See id at 12-19.
35. Leviticus 19:18 (King James).
36. See infra pp. 20-22.
37. See infra pp. 28-35.
38. See infra pp. 52-53.
39. See generally Calvin G. C. Pang, Eyeing The Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in
Law School Clinic, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 241, 243-44 (1999) (delving into whether teaching
law students and spirituality are mutually exclusive).
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time.40 That scholarship has laid out parameters that are useful to overview
before considering whether lawyers are able to use Dr. King, the preacher,
as a teacher of lawyerly practice. One might envision the existent
scholarship as a kind of call and response. The call comes from lawyers
and scholars who articulate a traditional view of the lawyer as partisan for
client without accountability for the client's moral choices, and with faith
as a suspect motivator. The response comes from another group of lawyers
and scholars who posit the lawyer to be in morally engaged relationship
with a client, informed by the lawyer's faith, and also by a client's faith, if
present.
A. THE CALL
The view of lawyering reflected by the call is a longstanding one -
what Bill Simon has labeled the "Dominant View" of lawyering in the
United States.41 It understands our adversary system of adjudication to
demand that actors in the system (lawyers, judges, disputants) conform
their behaviors to their assigned roles within the system. 42 The roles of
lawyers and disputants, in particular, are articulated in ways intended to
effectuate core liberal concepts of personal autonomy and freedom of
thought.43
Under the Dominant View, the adversary system is based on three
assumptions." First, that the disputants likely each have access to differing
pools of information relevant to the dispute, and have differing points of
view as to what an accurate, fair, or just result would be. Second, that the
most effective way to develop a full and accurate accounting of the
underlying facts and law of a dispute is to have an ardent presenter for each
side. Third, that a neutral arbiter (the judge) can take the competing
presentations and from them determine an accurate/fair/just result.
40. See Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging
Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1075-77 (1998)
(becoming the first article to use the label "Religious Lawyering Movement," and also providing
a historical overview of scholarship about law and religion). As Russell Pearce notes, the
Religious Lawyering Movement was presaged by earlier writings, most prominently those of
Thomas Shaffer. See id. at 1076.
41. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 7
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
42. Seeid. at7-11.
43. See id. at 63-64; Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand. The Plural Values of Client-
Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 369, 400-01 (2006) (noting the importance of
individual autonomy in U.S. political traditions).
44. See SIMON, supra note 41, at 7-11.
45. Id.
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Based on those assumptions, and mindful of personal autonomy and
freedom of thought, the adversary system derives the roles of disputant,
lawyer, and judge.4 5 The disputant is the one whose autonomy and freedom
of thought are to be secured.46 The lawyer is the translator and presenter
for the disputant within the processes of the adversary system.47 In order to
preserve the disputant's autonomy and freedom of thought, the lawyer
owes the disputant a duty of loyalty to accurately translate the dispute into
terms appropriate to be presented within the adversary system, and must
then advocate the disputant's point of view vigorously. Under the
Dominant View, the lawyer violates the disputant's autonomy and freedom
of thought if the lawyer imposes her own substantive moral judgments
when translating or presenting the disputant's case. 8 In exchange for not
engaging her own moral judgments, the lawyer is not held accountable by
the adversary system for the disputant's immoral choices.
There are varied descriptions of why and how a lawyer in the
adversary system is to preserve disputant autonomy and freedom of
thought. The most basic is to describe the lawyer-disputant relationship as
one of agent and principal.49 Under the doctrine of agency law, the lawyer
is subordinate to the disputant-principal, and takes instruction from the
principal.5" By relying on an agency relationship, the disputant is the lead
decision-maker, and thus is presumed to be motivated to keep her own




48. Here, I am distinguishing between judgments about procedure or strategy from moral
judgments about the merits of the underlying dispute or about the disputant's motivation. For
example, the Dominant View expects the lawyer to give advice to the disputant that it would be
better to file the lawsuit in state court rather than federal court, or that the complaint should
include causes of action in both contract and tort. The Dominant View prohibits the lawyer from
making moral judgments about the merits of the underlying dispute or about the disputant's
motivation. For example, refusing to raise a statute of limitations defense in a case in which the
disputant agrees she is liable.
49. See Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (And Therefore Clients)
Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 751 (2008) (providing several cites to state court decisions in
which the lawyer-disputant relationship is described as an agency relationship).
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Agency Defined) (2006).
51. See Wald, supra note 49, at 759.
52. See id. at 751-52.
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The agency descriptive has been criticized by ethics scholars, who
reject it as factually simplistic.53 The descriptive presumes the power
dynamic between lawyer and disputant is in favor of the disputant.
However, as an empirical matter, the dynamic generally is the opposite,
except in those cases in which the disputant is well-resourced and a legal
sophisticate (such as a corporate client).54 Thus, scholars argue that the
agency relationship is more often turned on its head with lawyer as
principal and disputant/client as agent.55
In an effort to better preserve a disputant-client's autonomy, scholars
have offered another descriptive - client- centered lawyering.56 The client-
centered approach is as much prescriptive as descriptive in that it instructs
a lawyer to be aware of the power imbalance between attorney and client
and prescribes the ways in which a lawyer should act in order to preserve
client/disputant autonomy.57 Under a client-centered approach, the lawyer
actively engages the client in the relationship so that the client is equally
involved in identifying, describing and categorizing her problem - both as
legal and as non-legal matters.58 The lawyer remains neutral as to the
client's goals and choices as a way of ensuring the client retains her
autonomy and freedom of thought.59 In essence, the client-centered model
prescribes lawyerly conduct so that the lawyer truly remains the agent of
the client/principal.
Critical to the concept of client-centered lawyering is the idea that a
client may conceptualize her problem along many different dimensions.
She might see her problem as one of tangled relationships, or of economic
53. See id. at 752-54 (summarizing scholars' rejection of principal-agency descriptive).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Joseph Allegretti, The Role of a Lawyer's Morals and Religion When
Counseling Clients in Bioethics, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9, 12-13 (2002) (describing such a
transmutation as an "authoritarian" model of lawyering).
56. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1977) [hereinafter LEGAL INTERVIEWING] (developing the phrase "client-centered
approach"). The book was further explicated in a subsequent work. See DAVID A. BINDER &
SUSAN PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (West Publishing
Co. 1991) [hereinafter LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS]. The phrase is now widely used,
particularly among clinical law faculty. See, e.g., Laurie Shanks, Whose Story is it Anyway? -
Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REV.
509 (2008); Kruse, supra note 43, at 369 ("This article examines the history, development and
theory of the client-centered approach to lawyering, which has become the most prevalent theory
of lawyering taught in law school clinics.").
57. See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 56, at 147-53.
58. See id. at 135-47.
59. See Kruse, supra note 43, at 373-74 (noting also that scholars have developed the client-
centered model in ways that permit lawyer intervention if it serves client autonomy).
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disadvantage, or of legal right, or of moral right.6" The lawyer facilitates
the client's work, but does not intercede in it and does not offer the
lawyer's own view on any of the dimensions. In other words, the lawyer
remains neutral as to the way the client conceptualizes her problems,
including the moral or ethical choices the client makes.6" When a client
reaches a decision about a course of conduct (only some of which may
require the lawyer's skills), it is the lawyer's job to move forward in
service of the client's decision. In that way, the lawyer best preserves
client autonomy and freedom of thought.
Defending client-centered lawyering, Norm Spaulding has
hypothesized a set of challenges facing lawyers who are to be in service of
their clients, but who also bring self interests to the representation.62 As
Spaulding articulates the issue, the Dominant View of lawyering designs
the role of lawyer to meet institutional needs of the adversary system, but
lawyers are motivated to shape that role to meet their own interests.63 For
Spaulding, the more the lawyer's self-interest is engaged by representing
the client (in Spaulding's terminology "thick identity"),6' the more likely it
is that the lawyer will use the representation to serve her own self-interests
rather than the client's. 65  Spaulding understands self-interest to include
economic interests (getting paid a high fee) and non-economic interests
(believing a client's goal is morally right).66 Thus, thick identification
distorts the attorney client relationship in a way that diminishes client
autonomy.67
Most relevant for this article, under Spaulding's model, thick identity
constrains the legal profession's ability to honor value pluralism. A lawyer
who thickly identifies with a client's values will go overboard for that
client, while a lawyer who cannot identify with a client's values, will refuse
to represent the client.68  Thus, the kind of values put in play to the
adversary system, and the degree to which those values are argued for, are
derived from the limited set of values represented by members of the legal
60. See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 56, at 138-40.
61. See id. at 147-50.
62. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1
passim (2003).
63. Seeid. at 10-ll.
64. Id. at 18.
65. See id at 23.
66. See id. at 16.
67. See id at 66-71 (describing examples of attorney self-interest that triggered paternalistic
behavior towards the client).
68. See Spaulding, supra note 62, at 13.
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profession, not the larger set represented by the public at large. 9
According to Spaulding, it is only through thin identity leading to true
client-centered lawyering, that value pluralism is protected.7" For
Spaulding, there is no possibility of unproblematic thick identity.7
From the above description of the Dominant View of lawyering it is
straightforward to discern that the Dominant View mistrusts lawyers who
look to religious values for guidance about how to lawyer.72 The critique is
a respectful one, but nonetheless, an ardent one that uniformly counsels
lawyers to separate religious faith from lawyering. 73 A lawyer's religious
values are understood to be, at best, irrelevant, to a lawyer's job to serve
client autonomy and client freedom of thought. At worst, religious values
create a thick identity problem - they cause a lawyer to either overly
engage or overly disengage with a client. Even if a client were to raise
religiously-based concerns, or articulate her problem in religious terms, the
lawyer should do nothing more than acknowledge the client's concerns and
encourage the client to make her own decisions about the place of religion
in solving her problem.74
Sandy Levinson, in his oft-cited 1992 article Identifying the Jewish
Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity,75
considered what it might mean for a Jewish lawyer to bring her faith to
bear on her lawyering.76 To frame the conversation, he notes that
[t]he triumph of what might be termed the standard version of the
professional project [the Dominant View] would, I believe, be the
creation, by virtue of professional education, of almost purely fungible
69. See id. at 78-79.
70. See id. at 79 ("[Tlhin professional identity operationalizes this presumption [of
autonomy] in the social arena by ensuring access to law on open terms, radically decentralizing
authority to decide who shall have representation and what social interests and comprehensive
doctrines shall be cast in the legitimating language of the law.").
71. See id. Interestingly, Spaulding argues his model does allow for some cause lawyering
(i.e., lawyering driven by commitment to a social cause compared to for-profit work). See id. He
suggests that those cause lawyers who work to fill the void in access to legal services for the poor
or disempowered are closer to his ideal of thin identity because they are motivated by the need for
legal services, not by the needs of particular clients. See id. at 101-02. For a description of faith-
based lawyering as cause lawyering, see Kevin R. Den Dulk, In Legal Culture, But Not of It: The
Role of Cause Lawyers in Evangelical Legal Mobilization, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 197-219 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2006).
72. See Spaulding, supra note 62, at 77.
73. See id.
74. See Allegretti, supra note 55, at 23-25 (posing a hypothetical under the client-centered
model where lawyer does not respond to client's religious concerns).
75. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of
Professional Identity, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1577 (1992).
76. See id. at 1577.
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members of the respective professional community. Such apparent
aspects of the self as one's race, gender, religion, or ethnic background
would become irrelevant to defining one's capacity as a lawyer.
That process of professional education is the bleaching out of
personal ethics, including those derived from religious faith.7"
While Levinson stops short of affirmatively calling on law schools to
bleach out their students, he crafts a tale of lawyering from faith that
suggests that its most powerful consequence is to put a lawyer at odds with
obligations of lawyering under the Dominant View.79 For example, a
Jewish lawyer who wishes to observe the Jewish Sabbath or Jewish
holidays, but who has a client who needs work done on those days.8" Or, a
Jewish lawyer who wishes to advocate consistently with Jewish law
(Halakhah), which Levinson understands to call for a kind of lawyering
other than that envisioned by the Dominant View.8 Or, a Jewish lawyer
who understands Halakhah to require certain conduct that American law
would not (e.g., suing in Jewish court instead of a secular court).82
In the end, Levinson's portrait is one of conflict in which a Jewish
lawyer's faith will cause her to behave unprofessionally - either because
she will be unable to do what her client asks her to do, or because she will
dominate her client and force her client to act in a particular way. 3 One
understands Levinson's portrait to teach that faith does not help a lawyer
better serve her client, it presents only difficult obstacles that entice a
lawyer to behave in domineering or dismissive ways that trump a client's
autonomy and freedom of thought.84
Martha Minow has been similarly skeptical about lawyers bringing
religious values to bear in their practice. 5 Like Levinson, she raises the
spectre of improperly-bounded lawyering.86 Looking at Christianity,
Minow worries that its focus on reconciliation would cause Christian
lawyers to avoid the confrontation she understands is required by the
adversary system. 87 As she articulates it:
77. Id. at 1578-79.
78. See id. at 1578, 1601.
79. Seeid. at 1591.
80. See id. at 1592.
81. See Levinson, supra note 75, at 1598-99.
82. See id. at 1602-03.
83. See id. at 1610-11.
84. See id.
85. See Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in
Professional Ethics, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 661 passim (2001).
86. See id. at 678-79.
87. See id.
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If all lawyers followed this search for conciliation, instead of pressing
adversarial interests and adverse rights, I confess I would worry. I
would worry about so truncated a range of lawyering styles for a client
who seeks to vindicate a right, not reconcile with an opponent, or
whose sense of violation would be compounded, not assisted, by
efforts to seek reconciliation. I would worry about the lawyer who is so
intent on conciliation that he or she does not explore with the client all
the litigation options. I would be concerned for those who do not share
the lawyer's religious views. And I would be concerned for an
adversary system predicated on competitive fact-finding and argument.
The system will not work if the lawyers appearing in court curtail the
arguments available to them in an effort to promote reconciliation
between the opposing parties.88
Minow accepts the standard justifications of the Dominant View - the
supremacy of client autonomy and freedom of thought. 89 Thus, she
perceives that a lawyer who imbues her practice with faith-based values
will not provide the full range of lawyering skills to her client, and that the
lawyer might dominate her client and trump client autonomy. 9° For
Minow, there does not appear to be any possibility that a lawyer could use
faith-based values in service to a client.91
In addition to concerns about truncated or dominating lawyering,
Minow adds another concern: that the language of faith is unfit to be used
when lawyering in a public arena.92 Affirming the Rawlsian idea of public
reason,93 she argues that "reasons used in political discussion must be
accessible to the comprehension, scrutiny, and response of those who do
not share the speaker's religious convictions. Otherwise, the prospects for
open and reasoned debate diminish potentially irreparably., 94  Under
Minow's vision of public reason, conversations from faith-based values are
not easily translated either across religions or from a religious to a secular
setting.95 Rather than considering positive possibilities of efforts to
translate across faiths or between faith and the secular, she argues that





91. See Minow, supra note 85, at 687.
92. See id. at 672.
93. See id. at 675.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 677-78.
96. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully critique the idea of public reason. Interested
readers may see Eduardo M. Pefialver, Is Public Reason Counterproductive?, 110 W. VA. L. REv.
515, 516 (2007) for the argument that limiting public discourse to secular language too narrowly
cabins it and, as a result, disrespects pluralism.
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Levinson and Minow are not the only scholars or lawyers who are
leery of lawyers bringing faith-based values into their professional work,
but they are exemplary of the critique.9 7 The Dominant View presumes
only two kinds of lawyers, those who remain neutral towards their clients,
but who avidly pursue their client's objective, and those who cannot remain
neutral towards their clients, and who disturb client autonomy with bad
consequences.98 It is a view that expects the worst of lawyers, what
Thomas Shaffer has called the bad man theory of lawyering. 99 In its
extraordinary concern for the bad-man lawyer, the Dominant View looks to
the worst behavior. By always describing the worst behavior, the
Dominant View reinforces the notion that any behavior by a lawyer that is
other than neutral disconnectedness is bad.' °
B. THE RESPONSE." 1
The response challenges the Dominant View of lawyering. Consider
97. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1999) (rejecting idea of unified norms in the legal profession, and calling
for value pluralism, but rejecting religious values as a source for professional norms); Leslie
Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253,
1253 (1998) (acknowledging the role of religious values in determining personal conduct, but
arguing that the legal profession must be able to articulate professional norms using secular,
public reason). The role of religion outside the Dominant View has been criticized by some
scholars. See Stephen Wizner, Religious Values, Legal Ethics, and Poverty Law: A Response to
Thomas Shaffer, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 41-42 (2003) (acknowledging a personal connection
with faith-based values, but expressing concern that religious texts are problematic sources of
values because one can find multiple and conflicting values within the same text); see also Bruce
A. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 283, 283 (2006) (noting the
Religious Lawyering Critique may not have acknowledged the ways in which secular legal
professional values are already consonant with religious values).
98. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 191 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
99. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 21-22 (West Publishing Co. 1994) (describing how lawyers encourage
clients to maintain a focus on self interests).
100. I want to emphasize that I am not arguing there are no hard cases for a lawyer who
considers faith-based values. Of course there are, and they are troublesome for the very reasons
articulated by the Dominant View. My argument is that hard cases are not the only kind of cases
that come about when a lawyer considers his or her faith tradition.
101. Here I will focus on the response to the Dominant View from the Religious Lawyering
Movement. There has also been a sustained critical response from a secular perspective which
challenges the Dominant View's requirements that lawyers be loyal, partisan advocates who
unengaged with, and not accountable for, their client's moral choices. Seminal critiques include:
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (Princeton Univ. Press 1988);
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY]; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A
THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
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Thomas Shaffer, who has offered an ardent and sustained accounting of
how his religious faith demands that he behave as a lawyer. 112 Shaffer's
account is personal as well as theoretical, drawing from his experiences as
a lawyer and the personal stories of others." 3 Shaffer's consistent message
is that lawyers of Christian faith (Shaffer speaks from his own Catholic
tradition) are necessarily situated first within their religious communities
(just as all persons are necessarily situated first within some primary
community)." ° From those communities, lawyers (and others) discern their
moral obligations." 5 For the Christian lawyer, "[t]he goal and purpose of a
virtuous life in a profession is to help others become good persons .... ""'
In part through use of personal experience, Shaffer crafts an extended
narrative that pushes for space in the existing narrative of the Dominant
View of lawyering. Where the Dominant View insists on lawyers who are
disengaged, and presumes the worst of both lawyers and clients (each of
whom will act as bad men), Shaffer insists on a contrary view. One in
which he, and other Christian lawyers, are deeply engaged with their
clients, which presumes each to have the capacity for mutual moral
conversation, and which leads to beneficial results.' 7
Shaffer's is not the only narrative. His has been joined by other
lawyer-scholars in the Christian faith,0 8 as well as lawyer-scholars from
102. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 231 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson from Trollope for Counselors at Law, 35 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 727 (1978); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW
FOR THE INNOCENT (Brigham Young Univ. Press 1981) [hereinafter ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND
A LAWYER]; THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1991)
[hereinafter LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES]; SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 99, at 90-
91.
103. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 99, at 90-92. Stories of Shaffer and other
lawyers are woven throughout, including in the form of written dialogue. See id
104. See id. at 40-41.
105. See id. at 34-35.
106. LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES, supra note 102, at 94. Shaffer repeats his call for
lawyers to be good persons, and to help clients be good persons in other works as well. See, e.g.,
SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 99, at 44-48.
107. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 99, at 40-55.
108. See Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on Legal
Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1116-17 (1998) (suggesting that the relationship
between lawyer and client is akin to a covenant); see also Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd,
A Symposium Prcis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911, 1259 (1996) (introducing symposium in which
lawyers of many faiths were asked to narrate how faith informed their professional work);
Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1405,
1408-09 (1998); Amelia J. Uelmen, Can a Religious Person Be a Big Firm Litigator?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1069, 1069 (1999); Robert. K. Vischer, Catholic Social Thought and the
Ethical Formation of Lawyers: A Call for Community, I J. CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 417
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other faiths. For example, Russell Pearce has written eloquently about the
centrality of Judaism in answering for him "what it means to be an ethical
lawyer.. .. "'09 Pearce affirms Shaffer's position that it is untenable for a
lawyer of faith to lawyer without regard to values that are core to his faith
tradition."0 Pearce articulates that being a faithful Jew requires him to
integrate his thought with his conduct. For Pearce, "lawyering demands a
rejection of the professional project's separation of the professional from
the religious self. As a Jewish lawyer, . . .[he] would direct ... [his] heart
toward God in every moment of... [his] legal practice. This task requires
study and prayer, but it also requires conduct."''l
Like Shaffer, Pearce has responded to the Dominant View in part with
a personal narrative as a way of claiming space in the conversation about
ethical lawyering. As Pearce and Amelia Uelmen have noted, the initial
call and response between the Dominant View and the Religious
Lawyering Movement has been about whether or not. 2 In other words,
the call of the Dominant View saying "Lawyer, do not bring personal
values like religion to bear in your lawyering," and the Religious
Lawyering Movement responding, "Lawyer, do so." The call and response
continue," 3 and will do so as long as the starting proposition is the
dichotomy of whether or not.
Nonetheless, the second wave of the Religious Lawyering Movement
has moved beyond the dichotomy "to assume that there should be space for
lawyers to bring their religious values into their professional work, and thus
focuses on more concrete and complex explorations of how to work as a
religious lawyer."' 4 The move to how reflects a core commitment to
integrating thought and action. Recall Pearce's comment that study and
prayer must join with conduct." 5 As philosopher Lenn E. Goodman has
described it: "[M]ere study and devotion, prayer and meditation, are
unfulfilled and unfulfilling without active engagement in behalf of our
(2004).
109. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson,
14 CARDozO L. REv. 1613, 1613 (1992).
110. See Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1259, 1259
(1996) [hereinafter Jewish Lawyer's Question].
111. Id. at 1268.
112. See Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering's Second Wave, 21 J.L.
& RELIGION 269, 274 (2005-06).
113. Seeid.at275.
114. Id. (emphasis added); see also Howard Lesnick, Riding the Second Wave of the So-
Called Religious Lawyering Movement, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283, 283 (2001) ("The Second
Wave is one in which the calling, as addressed to the religious lawyer, asks what are you doing
practicing law?").
115. See Jewish Lawyer's Question, supra note 110, at 1268.
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fellow human beings.""' 6
C. ENTER DR. KING
In order to effect social change, Dr. King also understood the need to
move beyond generalized, dichotomous talk. For race relations in the
1960's, the general conversation was limited to desegregate or stay
segregated." 7 Dr. King knew movement could only happen by leaving the
generalized realm and instead looking at specifics. For Dr. King, that
meant moving to direct action campaigns. To those who worried that his
direct action campaigns were too provocative or radical, he responded that
race-related tension already existed, that conversation did not further
illuminate or resolve the tension, but that direct action "dramatize[d] the
issue [so] that it can no longer be ignored."
'"18
The move of the second wave of the Religious Lawyering Movement
to the how is similar to Dr. King's move to direct action. It reminds
lawyers and scholars that a dichotomous conversation often cannot resolve
- either into previously unrecognized agreement or into a confirmation of
disagreement - without a move to direct action.' 9 In the case of religious
values and lawyering, the move to direct action requires taking a common
religious value and specifically applying it to lawyering conduct.
Taking Dr. King's call for love in action, this article now considers
how to translate that into a common religious value that is held across
several religious traditions, which can then be tested in specific lawyering
settings.
III. LOVE OFNEIGHBOR AS AN EXAMPLE OF LOVE INACTION
As noted earlier, Dr. King was well aware that his call for love in
action might be misunderstood or met skeptically by many in the Black
community.2 ° Over the course of his career as a preacher and civil rights
activist, he returned regularly to the topic of what love in action required. ' 2'
First, he clarified he was not speaking about a sentimental emotion.
122
Instead, he was speaking about "understanding, a redeeming good will for
116. LENN E. GOODMAN, LOvE THY NEIGHBOR As THYSELF 16 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
117. See TOH, supra note 4, at 290.
118. Id. at 291.
119. See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112, at 269-70.
120. See TOH, supra note 4, at 8.
121. See id. atpassim. From 1956 to 1968, Dr. King spoke or wrote at least fourteen times
about love in action or its requirements. See id.
122. See id. at 8.
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all men, an overflowing love which seeks nothing in return."' 123 Further,
love in action required a specific intent. As Dr. King described it,
"nonviolent resistance is also an internal matter. It not only avoids external
violence or external physical violence but also internal violence of
spirit."'124 Finally, love in action, as the phrase makes clear, requires action.
Dr. King's experience on the bus boycott in Montgomery was seminal for
him in that regard. Of the boycott, he said:
The experience in Montgomery did more to clarify my thinking on the
question of nonviolence than all of the books that I had read. As the
days unfolded I became more and more convinced of the power of
nonviolence. Living through the actual experience of the protest,
nonviolence became more than a method to which I gave intellectual
assent; it became a commitment to a way of life. Many issues I had
not cleared up intellectually concerning nonviolence were now solved
in the sphere of practical action.' 
25
Dr. King also noted the critical influence on him of Gandhi, saying:
Prior to reading Gandhi, I had about concluded that the ethics of Jesus
were only effective in individual relationships. The "turn the other
cheek" philosophy and the "love your enemies" philosophy were only
valid, I felt, when individuals were in conflict with other individuals;
when racial groups and nations were in conflict a more realistic
approach seemed necessary.126
Gandhi's approach helped Dr. King to clarify the causal relationship
that exists between practicing love in action towards an individual and the
ultimate goal of creating a shared community (or "beloved community" in
Dr. King's words).
127
For Dr. King, then, love in action had four dimensions. 121 It was
other-regarding and universal. In other words, it called for good will
towards all, without expectation of return. 29 It also required a specific
internal intent, and was not limited to external conduct. 30 That intent then
required consistent conduct, or action.131
Consider now the concept of love of neighbor as it is articulated in
123. Id.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 38.
126. AMLK, supra note 2, at 23-24.
127. TOH, supra note 4, at 12.
128. See id. at 19.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at 18.
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Leviticus, the third Book of the Bible. 3 ' The relevant verse reads: "Thou
shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy
people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself... .""' Of course, Dr.
King was-trained in a Christian religious tradition, thus well-versed with
Leviticus. Presumably, he understood love of neighbor to be related to his
call for love in action. But, to ensure that others in Christian traditions
would concur, it will be helpful to look at perspectives from additional
Christian writers, particularly those who write about Christianity as it
relates to lawyering.
Furthermore, because this article has as one of its goals the
examination of a religious value that is shared across multiple faith
traditions, it must also consider whether the concept of love of neighbor
translates beyond Christianity. The article considers two additional faith
traditions: Judaism and Buddhism. The Book of Leviticus is text shared by
Judaism and Christianity, but is not a part of Buddhist canon. 34 Thus,
before presuming that love of neighbor is a religious value that one may
productively apply to specific lawyerly conduct, it is important to consider
whether it is possible to consider a concept across faiths in which a
canonical text is not shared.
A. THE POSSIBILITY OF SHARING CONCEPTS ACROSS FAITHS
For there to be a fruitful possibility of sharing concepts across faiths,
there must be a willingness of participants to connect with, and establish
contact across, differing faith traditions. Stating the obvious, interfaith
dialogue is hard.'35 It is hard because of histories of tension between faith
traditions.'36 It is hard because religions do not necessarily share common
languages or narratives. 137 It is hard in the context of religious conversation
and the legal profession because of the Dominant View's commitment to
the liberal idea of public reason that lawyering is a sufficiently public
132. See Leviticus 19:18.
133. Id. The translation in the King James version of the Bible is: "Thou shalt not avenge, nor
bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself...
" In Judaism, Leviticus is one of the five Books of Moses. See ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOK
OF MOSES: A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY x-xiv (2004). In Christianity, Leviticus is part
of the Old Testament. See Old Testament (New Living Translation).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Amelia J. Uelmen, Reconciling Evangelization and Dialogue Through Love of
Neighbor, 52 VILL. L. REV. 303, 306 (2007) [hereinafter Reconciling Evangelization] (opening
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activity such that the only appropriate conversation in the public square is
done in secular language that might be understood by all.'38 Dr. King faced
a similar challenge in seeking to share community across racial lines.'39 He
noted "the ability of Negroes and whites to work together, to understand
each other, will not be found ready-made; it must be created by the fact of
contact."'14  So, too, must there be contact across faiths for there to be
fruitful sharing of concepts.
Fortunately, there are already numerous examples of contact and of
vibrant interfaith conversations."' In the broader world, one can see
examples from each of the three faith traditions from this article.'42 From
Buddhism, the work of Thich Nhat Hanh, the founder of the Buddhist
Order of Interbeing, is exemplary.'43 From Christianity, the work of the
Focolare Movement, and its founder, Chiara Lubich, is exemplary.'" From
Judaism, the work of the Commission on Interreligious Affairs of Reform
Judaism is exemplary.'45
More particularly, there are numerous examples of vibrant interfaith
conversations among U.S. lawyers, such as conferences to monthly
meetings to CLE programs.'46 The fact that at least some groups of lawyers
have found ways for interfaith conversation reminds us that "the
assumption that religious people are intolerant and incapable of complex
interactions in a pluralistic society is a stereotype."' 47 The above examples
demonstrate the possibility of interfaith conversations among lawyers is
already present.
B. THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SHARING CONCEPTS ACROSS FAITH
One of the challenges to productively sharing a concept across faith
138. See Minow, supra note 85, at 675; see also Pefialver, supra note 96, at 521-22
(reviewing justifications for public reason).
139. See TOH, supra note 4, at 318.
140. Id.
141. See Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 306-07.
142. See infra Part III.C-E.
143. See generally THICH NHAT HANH, LIVING BUDDHA, LIVING CHRIST 2-4 (Riverhead
Books 1995) (discussing several examples of interfaith dialogue).
144. Cf Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 307-08 (briefly discussing the
Focolare Movement); see also Focolare Movement, http://www.focolare.us/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2009).
145. See Commission on Interreligious Affairs, http://interreligious.xj.orgfabout/about.shtml
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009). I would like to express my gratitude to Russell Pearce for identifying
the Commission's work for me.
146. See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112, at 271,274.
147. Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A
Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 158-59 (2004).
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traditions is that of translation.'48 First, there may be literal translation
issues. An example is the difference in translation between the Torah and
the Christian Bible of Exodus 20:2-15 - the commandment not to steal.
1 49
Commentary in the Torah notes some rabbinic interpretations of "steal"
understand it to refer to kidnapping. 5 ' The Christian Bible does not so
limit the meaning."'
Or, in Buddhism, the need to translate its primary texts from Pali or
Sanskrit into English may cause some confusion.5 2  For example, a core
concept in Buddhism is dukkha, generally translated into English as
"suffering."' The English word suffering carries meaning in various faith
traditions.'54  For example, Christianity builds on the idea that Jesus
suffered (including dying on the cross) so that humankind could "live unto
righteousness."'55 The Christian idea of suffering is rich with images of
physical pain.'56 However, Pali or Sanskrit translators explain the roots of
dukkha are more akin to the English ideas of unsatisfactory or things awry
or flawed."' Those ideas may include physical pain, but they would not
148. See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112, at 274.
149. See Exodus 20:2-15.
150. See ETz HAYIM, TORAH AND COMMENTARY: THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, THE UNITED
SYNAGOGUE OF CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 448 (The Jewish Publication Society 2001). Thank
you to Sam Levine for this example.
151. See Ephesians 4:28 ("[t]he thief must no longer steal, but rather labor, doing honest work
with his own lands, so that he may have something to share with one in need."); Jeremiah 7:9-11
("[a]re you to steal and murder ... and yet come to stand before me in this house which bears my
name, and.., has this house which bears my name become in your eyes a den of thieves?").
152. There are three main branches of Buddhism: Theravadan, Mahayana, and Vajrayana.
See The Three Main Branches of Buddhism,
http://www.important.ca/threebranches-of buddhism.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). The
Theravadan School's text is written in Pali, while the Mahayana School's text is written in
Sanskrit. See id.
153. Dan Edwards, Reflections on Three Stories: "Practicing" Law and Christianity at the
Same Time, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1996).
154. Compare Jobs 4:8 ("[als I see it, those who plow for mischief and sow trouble, reap the
same."), with Colossians 1:24 ("[nlow I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I
am filling up what is lacking in the afflictions of Christ on behalf of his body ... ").
155. See 1 Peter 2:21-24. In finding that the suffering and death of Christ serves as both a
source of salvation and example, the First Letter of Peter states:
For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an
example that you should follow in his footsteps. "He committed no sin, and no deceit
was found in his mouth." When he was insulted, he returned no insult; when he
suffered, he did not threaten; instead, he handed himself over to the one who judges
justly. He himself bore our sins in his body upon the cross, so that, free from sin, we
might live for righteousness. By his wounds you have been healed.
Id.
156. Cf id.
157. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, BUDDHA 23 (James Atlas ed., Penguin Group 2001).
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likely trigger an image of crucifixion.15 Thus, a Buddhist and a Christian
speaking about suffering, without first confirming what ideas are captured
by the word, may find they walk away from their conversation with very
different ideas about what ground they covered.
Language translation issues generally can be overcome simply by
being mindful. 59 Those looking to talk about and compare texts need to
first look at whether the texts present language translation issues. 6 ° If the
texts do, then the conversants need to learn about the possible translations
and settle on a mutual set of understandings about the meaning of the
material textual words on which their conversation will focus.' 6
Potentially more challenging than language translation issues are
translation issues dealing with the concept itself (although the two kinds of
translation issues may be intertwined).'62 For example, as noted above,
Buddhist texts do not have the phrase love thy neighbor. 63 The translation
that needs to occur, then, is at a conceptual level. For example, does love
of neighbor in the Christian and Jewish faiths encompass certain kinds of
conduct? Does it encompass a specific intention? Is intent or conduct
more important? How much overlap is there between the conceptual
contours of the particular shared text in Judaism and Christianity?
Once one has determined the conceptual contours derived from the
text of Leviticus, one must consider whether Buddhism includes similar
conceptual contours.' 64 The article will return to that particular conceptual
translation issue shortly165 and will consider the contours of love of
neighbor in Judaism and Christianity, 16 6 and whether there is a Buddhist
translation. '67
First, consider one more translation issue - that there is sufficient
consensus within a particular religion about certain concepts to make it
productive to converse across religions. Put differently, what good is
158. Cf id. (finding dukkha to be present during societal hardship).




163. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
164. Cf Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeff Selbin, From the "Art of War" to "Being
Peace": Mindfulness and Community Lawyering in the Neoliberal Age, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2073,
2112 (2007) (discussing the Buddhist concept of right livelihood, as expressed in Thich Nhat
Hanh's eleventh mindfulness principle, which asks people to take work that harms neither
humans nor nature in a physical or moral matter).
165. See infra Part II.D-E.
166. See infra Part III.C-D.
167. See infra Part UI.E-F.
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interfaith conversation if people of the same faith cannot agree with each
other? Thus far, the article has labeled Judaism, Christianity, and
Buddhism, without acknowledging each tradition has its own set of sub-
traditions. Some might argue there are as many differences within a faith
tradition as there are between faith traditions. 
168
For example, most Buddhist scholars consider there to be three main
movements of Buddhism -Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana - each of
which has numerous schools within it. 169 All of the movements follow the
teachings of Buddha, but through varying texts. 170 As with other religions,
the teachings of the Buddha were first transmitted orally. 7' Scholars
believe Buddha spoke in an Indian dialect,'72 but he encouraged monks to
teach in their own dialects.'73 Thus, Buddhist oral traditions are broad.'74
After the Buddha's death, written transcriptions began to appear, and likely
developed over the course of five to six centuries.'75 The Theravadan
Movement relies on a transcription in Pali, called the Pali Canon, which the
Movement understands to be a direct translation of Buddha's oral
teachings. 7 6 The Mahayanist School acknowledges the Pali Canon, but
also adds other transcriptions often written in Sanskrit.177 The schools
within the three main movements of Buddhism often vary by the way in
which each will highlight a certain doctrine or concept, much like schools
within Judaism or Christianity."' Buddhism, like Judaism and Christianity,
is not homogenous or monolithic.179
Thus, there is fertile conversation to be had within a single faith
tradition. As Religious Lawyering scholars have noted, one important facet
of a lawyer's own specific faith community is that it provides the lawyer
with a supportive and similarly-situated group in which to discern how to
168. See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112, at 274.
169. See BUDDHISM 29-32, 37 (Richard A. Gard ed., George Braziller 1962).
170. See id. at 27.
171. See SANGHARAKSHITA, ETERNAL LEGACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CANONICAL
LITERATURE OF BUDDHISM 9 (Tharpa Publications 1985).
172. See id. at 3.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 13-14.
176. See id. at 12-13.
177. See SANGHARAKSHITA, supra note 171, at 22, 93-95. For example, the Buddhist
monastic code has been translated into Pali as part of the Pali Canon, but also translated into six
versions in Sanskrit. See id. at 22. Similarly, the Collection of Discourses has one version in the
Pali Canon, and another in the Mahayanist tradition, often referred to as the Mahayana Sutras.
See id. at 93.
178. See BUDDHISM, supra note 169, at 29.
179. See Paul Morton, The Evolution of God.- An Interview with Robert Wright, TIKKUN
MAGAZINE, July 06, 2009, http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/20090706081645927.
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integrate her faith and her profession. 8° As Robert Vischer describes it,
people learn within their communities, and a community offers a
productive space in which differing views and experiences can "be
weighed and distilled into essential truth(s).''
Nonetheless, interfaith conversation often provides an unexpected
window into both another's faith and one's own faith. 182 Two stories help
to demonstrate that.18 3 Howard Lesnick, in his book, Listening for God,
184
describes being raised in a "mild variety of Conservative Judaism" and
becoming alienated from Judaism in college. 85  Then, in the 1970's,
Lesnick describes reengaging with religion when he began attending
Quaker meetings, and also "mostly by accident" spent several summers at a
Zen Buddhist farm.'86 Lesnick describes some disquietude in discovering
he was "open to every religion but my own .... Lesnick discovered his
engagement in faiths other than his own allowed him to view his own
tradition in a renewed way. 188  It also revealed to him "the profound
commonalities" between Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism.
89
Russ Pearce describes an uncomfortable discovery of anti-Semitism
by noted social justice advocate, and theologian, William Stringfellow. 9 °
In preparing for a conference to honor the legacy of Stringfellow, Pearce
came across Stringfellow's 1963 remarks at a conference on religion and
race where, in speaking about unity among men, Stringfellow insisted
"[t]he issue is baptism" - a remark which participants found offensive as
suggesting that Jewish colleagues, as the unbaptized, were outsiders."'
Acknowledging Stringfellow's remark was anti-Semitic, Pearce takes up
the challenge of interfaith conversation to look further at Stringfellow's
180. See Vischer, supra note 108, at 428-32, 438-39; see also Pearce & Uelmen, supra note
112, at 274; Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and Jurisprudence From Within Religious
Congregations, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961, 963 (2001) (arguing for the importance of religious
communities as communities of moral discernment).
181. Vischer, supra note 108, at432.
182. See Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112, at 274, 276-77.
183. See HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT
(Authors Choice Press, 1998); RUSSELL G. PEARCE, LEARNING FROM THE UNPLEASANT TRUTHS
OF INTERFAITH CONVERSATION: WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW'S LESSONS FOR THE JEWISH
LAWYER, 38 CATH. LAW. 255 (1998).
184. See LESNICK, supra note 183.
185. Id. at 13-18.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 22.
188. See id. at 23.
189. Id.
190. See PEARCE, supra note 183, at 255-56.
191. Id. at 256-57 (internal quotes omitted).
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writing and legal career.192 From those he builds a portrait of Stringfellow
as a lawyer committed to a vocation of helping the poor, underserved, and
underrepresented.'93 Pearce then looks to his Jewish faith and notes a
Jewish lawyer "might very well arrive at the same answer as William
Stringfellow" as to the lawyer's vocation to serve the poor and
underrepresented.'94 Pearce does not in any way excuse Stringfellow's
anti-Semitism, but uses it as a way of demonstrating how interfaith
conversation can happen despite "discovering hurtful differences."' 95
The stories of Lesnick and Pearce are exemplary of the possibilities of
productive interfaith conversations, while also foregrounding its
difficulties. Building on the possibility of productive conversation, the
article sketches out possible contours of love of neighbor in each religious
tradition, considering there are common themes. 196 Mindful of the fact that
faith traditions are not uniform, the article offers the descriptions as one set
of possibilities coming from each tradition, not as the definitive set. 97
C. A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
Thomas Shaffer has articulated a responsibility for lawyers to take a
"risk of openness."'98  While not using the phrase love of neighbor,
Shaffer's conception of risk of openness captures the idea of bridging
divides between oneself and another."' For Shaffer, being open means
each person in a professional relationship "meets the other in a deep way,
[and] . . . meets the One in the other ... .""2 Shaffer conceives of the
relationship as one in which both lawyer and client welcome the moral
conversation of the other and are open to the possibility that the
conversation may change either of them.2' Drawing on the work of Jewish
philosopher, Martin Buber, Shaffer underscores that the lawyer commits to
a belief that there is "something in the other (e.g., client) that [the lawyer]
... can come to trust: 'The worst in him and the best in him are dependent
on one another ... what we may call the good, is always only a direction.
192. See id. at 255-56.
193. See id. at 259-61.
194. Id. at 262.
195. Id. at 255.
196. See LESNICK, supra note 183, at 23-24.
197. See PEARCE, supra note 183, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
198. ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 28.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 29.
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Not a substance.' ' ' 0 2 As a consequence of being open to the client, the
relationship between lawyer and client, with lawyer representing client,
involves the "acceptance of the principle (and of the fact) that even in
'representation' it is not only an argument or interest being asserted, but a
person and a relationship being not asserted, but lived.,
20 3
Shaffer calls for a particular intent from lawyers, which in turn, drives
actions.2°4 Understanding Shaffer's call for openness as consonant with
love of neighbor, the requisite intent of love of neighbor would include
receptivity, compassion, discovery, and commitment, while disavowing
domination, manipulation, presumptiveness, and disengagement.
Amelia Uelman has also considered the intentionality called for by
love of neighbor.2 5 In looking at the possible tension for a Catholic
between a commitment to dialogue and the Catholic Church's evangelizing
mission, Uelman has drawn on love of neighbor as a way of navigating
both provisions.0 6 Uelman consults papal writings to consider what
characteristics are called for by the notion of Christ's love, and thus, the
characteristics to strive for in love of neighbor. 207  Resonating with
Shaffer's idea of openness, Uelman identifies love as self-emptying, the
letting go of individual attachments so that one might "make himself
everything to everyone.''  Further, love is universal, "it means loving
everyone." 209 It is concrete; it requires intent and "practical commitment,"
such as "concern, tenderness, compassion, openness, availability and
interest in people's problems. 210
Both Shaffer and Uelman describe certain intentions required by love
of neighbor.21  First, they describe an "openness" or "self-emptying," an
intent to set aside self-interest or self-involvement. 2  Next "trust" or
"universality," an intent to be receptive to another regardless of the
characteristics or conduct of the other.21 3 Finally, an intent to do, engaging
202. Id. (quoting Martin Buber).
203. Id.
204. See ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 30.
205. See Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 306-09.
206. See id.
207. Seeid. at311,327-29.
208. Id. at 312 (quoting John Paul II).
209. Id. at 313.
210. Id. (quoting Benedict XVI).
211. See Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 311; ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A
LAWYER, supra note 102, at 28-30.
212. Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 311-12; see also ON BEING A CHRISTIAN
AND A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 28-29.
213. Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 311, 13; see also ON BEING A CHRISTIAN
AND A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 87-90.
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in conduct to demonstrate openness and universality. 24
D. A JEWISH VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
Professor Samuel Levine has written extensively on the ways in
which Jewish law might inform ethical lawyering. 215  He has indentified
love of neighbor as an important general principle in Jewish law that may
"be applied to govern situations not delineated in the Torah."' 1 6 As Levine
notes, Jewish scholars have delineated some of the specific conduct
required by love of neighbor, such as visiting the sick, but the delineations
are exemplary, not exclusive.2 7  Thus, love of neighbor stands as an
ongoing source of existing, but "unenumerated" precepts28 It not only
guides extraordinary circumstances, it guides daily and mundane actions,
which, in some ways, are more important . 9
But love of neighbor calls for a particular intentionality as well, as
philosopher Lenn Goodman has detailed.220  For Goodman, love of
neighbor starts by acknowledging that individuals can be self-interested
and egotistical and it then calls on a person to realize that another's interest
must be equally acknowledged. 22' As Goodman puts it:
Individual interests are presumed. Without them, the biblical
imperative [of love of neighbor] becomes empty rhetoric. Mutuality is
a moral implication of equality, treating the other as another self...
What the mitzvah ordains is that one deem all of another's concerns as
weighty as one's own.
222
Echoing Shaffer's notion of "openness" and Uelman's of "self-
214. See Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 311, 13; ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND
A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 29.
215. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at American
Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH.
U. L. REv. 165 (2007) [hereinafter Ethical Obligations]; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes
Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative
Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) [hereinafter Ethics Codes]; Samuel J.
Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A
Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511 (1998) [hereinafter
Unenumerated Rights]; Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating
Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1199 (1996) [hereinafter Broad
Life].
216. Ethical Obligations, supra note 215, at 187.
217. See Ethics Codes, supra note 215, at 571-72; see also Ethical Obligations, supra note
220, at 187-88; Unenumerated Rights, supra note 215, at 525-26.
218. Unenumerated Rights, supra note 215, at 525-56; Ethics Codes, supra note 215, at 571.
219. See BroadLife, supra note 215, at 1199.
220. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 13-14.
221. See id. at 13.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
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emptying," Goodman describes the intent involved in looking at another's
concern "does [not] mean wanting for others just what we want for
ourselves. Still less is it wanting others to be just like us.... The love that
the Torah commends and commands means accepting the sanctity of each
person's capacity to choose and cherish.,
223
Goodman reminds us the appropriate translation of neighbor from
Hebrew to English includes the idea of a stranger, so the command of love
of neighbor is an inclusive one.224 It is universal, to use Uelman's term.225
Finally, good will is not enough.226 Love of neighbor requires action; recall
Goodman's earlier quote that "mere study and devotion, prayer and
meditation, are unfulfilled and unfulfilling without active engagement in
behalf of our fellow human beings. 227  That engagement need not be
extravagant, it may be as simple as "fac[ing] one's interlocutor, showing
not just a profile or a blank, poker face but a responsive, expressive face,
evincing warmth and interest. 228
E. A BUDDHIST VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
To situate the idea of love of neighbor in Buddhism, it is useful to
first describe some core Buddhist concepts. 229 As noted earlier, Buddhism
does not share texts with Judaism and Christianity nor does it work from a
notion of a personal "Creator-God., 23 ° Thus, if Buddhism embraces an
idea of love of neighbor it starts from some place other than as a command
from holy text.
In Buddha's first lecture after his enlightenment, he described the
pivotal propositions of Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths. 231 They are:
First Noble Truth: Life is dukkha (usually translated in English as
223. Id. at 14.
224. See id. at 15.
225. See id.; Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 313.
226. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 16.
227. Id. at 16.
228. Id. at 17.
229. For this paper the author focuses on select core Buddhist concepts and does not offer a
comprehensive description. Those readers who wish for a deeper introduction may wish to see
HUSTON SMITH & PHILIP NOVAK, BUDDHISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION (HarperCollins 2003),
and ARMSTRONG, supra note 157. For an articulation of Buddhism within the school in which
the author practices, The Order of Interbeing, readers may wish to see THICH NHAT HANH, THE
HEART OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHINGS: TRANSFORMING SUFFERING INTO PEACE, JOY &
LIBERATION (Parallax Press 1998).
230. SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 53; GARD, supra note 173 at 44-47.
231. See SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 31.
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"suffering").232
Second Noble Truth: The cause of dukkha is tanha (usually translated
in English as "desire").233
Third Noble Truth: The end of dukkha comes by overcoming tanha.234
Fourth Noble Truth: The way of overcoming tanha is the Eightfold
Path.235
Recall that dukkha, or suffering, is captured by the idea that things are
askance or dislocated; "its pivot is not true." '236 The reason that our lives
are akimbo is that we crave permanence in a -world that is ever-changing.
237
We desire personal fulfillment, which pushes us to cling to a false sense of
an individualized, separate, permanent self.238 Once we understand that
that our dislocation is caused by the "narrow limits of self-interest," we
may overcome our dislocation by following the Eightfold Path. 239  Our
destination upon overcoming dukkha and tanha is equanimity toward all,
expressed through loving-kindness, compassion, and mindfulness.24 °
Before exploring the Eightfold Path, first consider the Buddha's idea of
interconnectedness.
The Buddha described the interconnectedness of everything as
"dependent arising" - that everything and every process arises in, and is
dependent on, every other thing and process. 24' As a result, the world is a
place webbed by interconnectedness, not a place full of individuated and
separated beings and processes. As Thich Nhat Hanh has described it:
"You cannot just be by yourself alone. You have to inter-be with every
other thing., 242 One of Buddha's most well-known phrases, and one which
repeats itself throughout Buddhist texts in all traditions is about dependent
arising: "This is because that is. This is not, because that is not. This
comes to be, because that comes to be. This ceases to be, because that
ceases to be. 243
Dependent arising propounds that what may appear as dichotomous,
232. Id. at 32.
233. Id. at 36.
234. Id. at 32, 36-37.
235. Id. at 37.
236. Id. at 34.
237. See SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 34-35.
238. See id. at 36-37.
239. Id. at 37.
240. See id. at 39.
241. Id. at 61.
242. THICHNHAT HANH, ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 56 (Robert Ellsberg, ed., Orbis Books 2001).
243. THICH NHAT HANH, supra note 229, at 221.
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ultimately reveals itself as interdependent.2" Again, Thich Nhat Hanh:
All phenomena are interdependent. When we think of a speck of dust,
a flower, or a human being, our thinking cannot break loose from the
idea of unity, of one, of calculation. We see a line drawn between one
and many, one and not one. But if we truly realize the interdependent
nature of the dust, the flower, and the human being, we see that unity
cannot exist without diversity. Unity and diversity interpenetrate each
other freely. Unity is diversity, and diversity is unity. This is the
principle of interbeing.
245
Returning to the Eightfold Path then, one can understand it as a daily
intentional regime designed to help one become aware of mistaken notions
of self, self-interest and craving for permanence, and to become aware of,











The Path is not linear - one does not start at Right View, perfect it,
and then move to Right Intent, and so on.2 48 It is a "noble path of eight
limbs" with each limb requiring the other and all requiring practice
together.249 For purposes of this article, it is likely most helpful to expand
on one part of the Path as it is illustrative of all parts of the Path.
Consider Right Speech. Inherent in the concept are both intent and
conduct.251 The intent is to be aware of the power of words.252 The power
to mislead or inform, to trigger emotions from anger to happiness, to cause
244. See id.
245. THICH NHAT HANH, supra note 242, at 67.
246. See SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 39.
247. Id. at 41-49.
248. See THICH NHAT HANH, supra note 229, at 117.
249. Id. at 50,117-18.
250. See generally SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at ch.5; THICH NHAT HANH, supra note
229, at Part 2.
251. See DAMIEN KEOWN, THE NATURE OF BUDDHIST ETHICS 121 (Palgrave 2001) (detailing
the requirement of the Eightfold Path for both intent and conduct).
252. See THICH NHAT HANH, supra note 229, at 85.
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discord or harmony.253 The conduct is not only mindful word choice, but
the precursor of "deep listening" - to "listen with the eyes of compassion"
so that one is moving beyond self-interest." 4 The practice of Right Speech,
like all of the Path, encourages intent and conduct that allows one to move
beyond a sense of separated self, to a sense of interconnectedness.
2 5
From the above, one can see the call of "love of neighbor" is easily
accommodated within Buddhism. As part of one's efforts to understand
and work towards interconnectedness, an intent to be other-regarding and
to act with compassion towards another (i.e., love one's neighbor) is
consistent with the Eightfold Path.
F. COMMONALITIES
The commonalities between Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism
related to love of neighbor are captured along the same four dimensions
that are present in Dr. King's love in action.256 First, love of neighbor is
other-regarding - one takes a perspective that places the interests of another
on equal footing with one's own. 7 Next, it is inclusive and universal -
one must respond to everyone with openness and equanimity, and no
particular relationship need stand above another.258 Third, although this
dimension is implicit in the first two, it requires a specific intent - one must
hold the intent to be other regarding and universal.2 59 Those may not be
just by-products of self-interest (i.e., It is not "I'll scratch your back if you
scratch mine."). Finally, it requires action - one must engage in the world,
from mundane actions onward.2 61 It is not enough to passively respond to
other's conduct.261
Having found that Dr. King's love in action could also be understood
as love of neighbor, and that such a concept is shared across religious
traditions, the next step is to apply the concept to lawyerly practice.
253. See id. at 85.
254. Id. at 86.
255. See id. at 85. For a description of other mindfulness practices that are derived from the
Eightfold Path, and their application to lawyering, see Harris, Lin & Selbin, supra note 164.
256. See Leviticus 19:18 (appearing in religious texts of both Judaism and Christianity).
257. See, e.g., id. (King James) ("love thy neighbor as thyself").
258. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 15 (stating the command of "love of neighbor" is
inclusive); Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 313 (finding love "means loving
everyone").
259. See KEOWN, supra note 251, at 84-87 (stating the practice "Right Speech" allows one to
move beyond a sense of separated self to a sense of interconnectedness).
260. See TOH, supra note 4, at 12 (stating the intent required is a specific internal intent that
is not limited to external conduct).
261. See id. at 12 (stating intent requires consistent conduct).
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IV. WHAT'S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Dr. King was working in a time of notable social upheaval.262 In his
work, love in action, while it may have focused on a mundane, daily
activity like riding a bus, was immediately transformed into action about
broad social change.263 For us now, the name Rosa Parks does not bring to
mind an ordinary woman.264  Rosa Parks was the woman who started
desegregation in Montgomery, Alabama. 265  Her action was not ordinary
and mundane - it was heroic. Thus, when one thinks about the context in
which Dr. King was relying on love in action, one thinks of big events, not
of the routine.
In contrast, for contemporary lawyers, most of their time is spent on
legal tasks that are mundane and ordinary; tasks like document review,
contract review, and general advice and counsel. If a contemporary
lawyer's work is mostly mundane and ordinary, is love in action relevant?
Dr. King would likely counsel that it is.
Dr. King understood that heroic moments had to be followed by
steady, daily work in order to preserve progress.266 Some eleven years after
Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat, with the struggle for civil rights
still at hand, Dr. King remarked: "The answer was only to be found in
persistent trying, perpetual experimentation, persevering togetherness. 267
Through his work he had discovered that the potency of a march or protest
did not last without daily, follow-up efforts.268 Thus, when he began a civil
rights campaign in Chicago with a rally at Soldier's Field, he did not stop
there.269 He encouraged and supported tenants in their efforts to create
tenant unions, which were then able to bargain collectively with local
landlords. 27' Those tenant unions dealt with daily, mundane issues like
janitorial services. 1
Love in action, then, should be as useful to a contemporary lawyer in
262. See Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 207, 240 (2009) (discussing the social
upheaval during the civil rights era of the 1960s).
263. See infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
264. See Parks remembered for her courage, humility, CNN, Oct. 30, 2005,
http://www.cnn.comI/2005/US/10/25/parks.reax/index.html (explaining Rosa Parks was one of the
most inspiring women of the twentieth century).
265. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 69.
266. See id. at318.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 308.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See AMLK, supra note 2, at 308.
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her daily law practice, as it would be to her in any part of her practice
focused on more monumental change. Because the majority of a lawyer's
time is spent on the mundane,272 this article will focus on examples of that
kind of lawyerly work in applying love in action, or love of neighbor.273
The article considers two lawyering moments: the initial meeting between
lawyer and client, and a meeting at which the lawyer and client discuss a
pre-filing settlement offer (i.e., an offer before a civil complaint has been
filed).274
Furthermore, the article considers the lawyering practice called for by
love of neighbor in light of the Dominant View's concern about religious
values causing a lawyer to disrespect client autonomy and to disrespect
value pluralism. 275 By applying love of neighbor in the specific contexts of
an initial lawyer-client meeting and a pre-filing settlement offer, the article
discerns whether the move to specific application provides a way to break
the logjam that exists in the more generalized conversation between the
Dominant View and Religious Lawyering.276
A. INITIAL MEETING BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT
Assume a common case: an individual client, not an entity, and an
attorney in private practice. 77 Outside of small claims actions, in which an
attorney is often not present, the most common kind of civil case is a
contract action.27" There is another reason to focus on a common case in
272. See SMU, Dedman College, Job Opportunities: Legal Careers,
http://smu.edu/prelaw/job.asp (describing the daily, mundane life of a lawyer).
273. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
274. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (8th ed. 2004). Offer of compromise is defined as
the "[a]n offer by one party to settle a dispute amicably to avoid or end a lawsuit or other legal
action.... Also termed offer of settlement." 1d.
275. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
276. See supra pp. 17-18.
277. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT:
THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990S vii (American Bar Foundation 1994). The American
Bar Foundation periodically publishes lawyer statistical reports in which it looks at various
descriptive information about the U.S. lawyer population. See id. According to the last report
covering data collected in 1991 and published in 1994, almost 45% of lawyers are solo
practitioners, with another 21% of lawyers practicing in firms of 20 lawyers or fewer. Id at 25;
see also John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson & Edward 0. Laumann, The Scale of Justice:
Observations on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 337, 341 (2001).
Most solo and small firm work focuses on individual client representation as opposed to corporate
representation. See id.; see generally Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 112 (discussing whether a
religious lawyer can work in a large firm).
278. See National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 32-33 (2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006_files/EWSC-2007WholeDocument.pdf (last
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addition to the fact it is a likely and consistent practice experience for a
lawyer. That reason is to challenge one of the typical features of the
existing Dominant View-Religious Lawyering discourse. 79
The discourse almost always presumes the uncommon case (or, the
"hard case"). 280 For example, a Catholic lawyer who is asked to represent a
minor girl who wishes to get an abortion without her parents' consent, and
who lives in a state with a statute requiring the minor to get a court's
permission for an abortion without parental consent. Focusing on a
common case is not a dodge of the hard cases. The hard cases are hard.
They make finding agreement hard, especially if both sides have
experienced the other primarily in disagreement. Changing the focus to the
everyday case, reminds us there is much more in the world of lawyerly
practice than hard cases. Thus, the change in focus also allows us to see
beyond the existing polarized discourse to discover possible areas of
agreement. It gives us the potential to experience agreement in the face of
a history replete with disagreement.281 It is following Dr. King's advice to
use the fact of contact to create understanding.
Consider, then, a client who contracted for a new roof and has found
that the new roof leaks. How would a lawyer mindful of love of neighbor
(the "LON lawyer") proceed with an initial client meeting. The lawyer
may consider many simple things such as where she and the client sit - in
the lawyer's office with an imposing desk between them, or in a conference
room, side-by-side. Has the lawyer made sure to set aside sufficient time
for the meeting, or does she announce when she comes in "I have 30
minutes before I have to be in court." Does the lawyer encourage the client
to start the conversation wherever she is most comfortable, or is the lawyer
directive? Does the lawyer solicit the client's hopes for outcomes in an
open way or does the lawyer quickly slot facts into a possible cause of
action and then announce the proposed outcome (i.e., You have a contract
claim and under contract law, the kinds of damages you can get are _.)?
For each of the simple examples above, it may be likely that most
lawyers would say they strive to behave as does the LON lawyer. It may
be that many lawyers would also say that the LON lawyer is not doing
anything differently from a conscientious, courteous lawyer. The LON
visited Jan. 31, 2010).
279. See supra pp. 17-18.
280. Minow, supra note 85, at 681. The author uses as an example a Catholic lawyer who
declined to represent a client regarding the client's abortion due to his religious beliefs. See id.
281. See Danny Brown, Conversation is Good, Jan. 11, 2009,
http://dannybrown.me/2009/01/l1/conversation-is-good/ (explaining that people have always
disagreed).
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lawyer would likely agree. If there is a difference it is in the constancy of
the intention. In other words, the LON lawyer commits to being mindful
about the mundane and simple at all turns - to acting intentionally rather
than habitually. Nonetheless, the LON lawyer and the conscientious
lawyer may not be dissimilar, while both may be in similar contrast to the
self-involved lawyer who puts her own interests ahead of the client's.
The similarity between an LON lawyer and other conscientious
lawyers is a notable response to the Dominant View's perception that the
necessary result of faith-based lawyering is domination or
disengagement.282 But as the above description makes clear, the LON
lawyer is actively working to engage her client as an equal, and to do so
from the very beginning of the relationship.283 It may be that the Dominant
View worries that the issue is not mundane lawyerly behavior, but behavior
during certain critical moments. But, the lawyer-client relationship consists
of much more of the mundane than the critical.284  Thus, it is in the
mundane that an attorney has repeated opportunities to demonstrate her
commitment to a client.285
The LON lawyer takes the mundane seriously and imbues the
mundane with possibility. An oft-heard story in Zen Buddhism is of the
eager learner who wishes to dig into the Zen practice and is told to go wash
dishes as the most important starting point, for if one cannot find meaning
in the mundane, one cannot find it anywhere.286
B. PRE-FILING SETTLEMENT OFFER
What, then, of a critical moment in the representation? How might an
LON lawyer act when meeting with her client to discuss a settlement offer
from the roofing company, which has come in response to the lawyer's
communications with the company that the client is considering filing a
lawsuit? Consider first what the tenor of the communications between
282. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
283. See supra p. 40.
284. See Stephen E. Schemenuaer, What We've Got Here . . . Is a Failure . . . To
Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation's Most Common Ethical Complaint, 30
HAMLINE L. REV. 629, 646 (2007). Note that lawyers get grieved by clients most often for
behavior such as not returning phone calls. See id.
285. See id. at 662.
286. See SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 102. "Zen wears the air of divine ordinariness.
... If you cannot find the meaning of life in an act as routine as that of doing the dishes, you will
not find it anywhere." Id.; see also LESNICK, supra note 183, at 18. When noting he was hoping
to learn more about Buddhism during his summer stay at a Buddhist farm, Lesnick was told:
"Great! Just go into the kitchen, and start doing the dishes!" Id.
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lawyer and roofing company might have been.
The LON lawyer, being committed to universality, will have treated
representatives of the roofing company with respect and courtesy. The
lawyer will not have sent a blustery demand letter in which the lawyer
insists on recompense in an overreaching way. The lawyer will, however,
have attempted to learn the roofing company's side of the story and to have
listened with a non-partisan ear.287 It is useful to highlight listening to note
that an important starting point for an LON lawyer is a multi-perspective
understanding, and that such understanding may happen when one is acting
on behalf of another. 88 Further, nothing about love of neighbor suggests
that an LON lawyer will undermine a client's interests or goals during
communications with the roofing company (recall Martha Minow's
concern about truncated lawyering).289
In other words, an LON lawyer will strive to understand the other
side, but in doing so will not demean or dismiss her own client's
interests. 29" To bring the principles of love of neighbor to bear, a lawyer
need not transform herself into a neutral seeking to mediate between two
parties.29' She honors her fiduciary commitment to her client, and her love
of neighbor commitment to both parties by mindful, open, compassionate
listening.292
Coming now to the meeting of the LON lawyer and her client in
which they discuss the roofing company's settlement offer. The LON
lawyer will have already kept her client abreast of the conversations with
the roofing company.293 The lawyer may either know that her client may
not be experienced in legal matters and may be particularly anxious about
the dispute, or may know that the client is experienced, and thus may wish
to have more regularized input.294 Regardless, as noted above, the LON
lawyer is mindful of the ordinary and mundane.295
At the meeting, the LON lawyer will start with the proposition that
the conversation is a mutual one, and that the client is willing, and
287. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINIcAL L. REV. 33, 70-72 (2001) (describing a process of envisioning a parallel universe as a
way of understanding alternative explanations for a client's behavior).
288. See id. (describing a process of envisioning a parallel universe as a way of understanding
alternative explanations for a client's behavior).
289. Seesupra p. 13.
290. See supra note 288.
291. Seesuprap. 13.
292. See supra note 288.
293. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983).
294. See id.
295. See supra p. 38.
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interested in, all facets of the conversation.296 The LON lawyer will
exchange any new information from the roofing company with the client
and make sure she learns of anything new from her client.297
When discussing possible action, the LON lawyer will be transparent
with her client about the lawyer's commitment to respect others, to show
compassion and the like.298 Importantly, the LON lawyer will underscore
those are her commitments and that she hopes to listen to, and understand
her client's own perspective on those commitments.299 If the lawyer
disagrees with the client, she will note that disagreement, but do so with
tact and consideration.3"0 As Lenn Goodman has described such an
engagement: "We are forbidden to shame him, but tact is not silence. Love
means overcoming reticence and, here, too, not standing idly by to watch
another stumble. 3 1
For example, the roofing company might have set up some
appointments with the client to repair the roof and the client may have
failed to be at home to let the company in. The LON lawyer would raise
that with the client in an honest and engaged manner - what was the
client's perspective on how firm the meetings times were, on why the client
was away, or on whether the company's employees would be irritated by
the missed appointments? The LON lawyer would not start with a lecture
the client about clean hands - signaling to the client that the lawyer is
morally superior - nor start by strategizing with the client about ways to
avoid the bad facts - signaling to the client that moral valence is
irrelevant.3 2
The LON lawyer would also look for shared interests between the
client and the roofing company, and focus those for the client.03 Thus, to
the extent the settlement offer broached common ground, the LON lawyer
would highlight that to try and move beyond a sense of tit for tat to shared
interests.34 Nonetheless, an LON lawyer is not categorically opposed to
going forward with a lawsuit (i.e., that love of neighbor demands
296. See id,
297. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (1983).
298. See id, (requiring lawyers to consult with the client as to the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished); GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 17 (describing particular facets
of one's attitude in dealing with others).
299. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 17.
300. See id. at 19.
301. Id.
302. See id. at 17.
303. See id.
304. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 95 (Houghton Mifflin 1991).
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reconciliation regardless). 35 But the going forward with a lawsuit happens
in a manner consistent with love of neighbor.30 6 Some examples might
include that the complaint is accurate and without bombast, that service of
process is done in a way not designed to embarrass or intimidate, and that
discovery goes forward in a timely and cost-effective way.30 7
As with the initial meeting between lawyer and client, many may say
the description of the LON lawyer meeting with her client about settlement
is consistent with the kind of conduct of any good lawyer. For example,
the LON lawyer's conduct is consistent with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which call on a lawyer to be diligent, to
communicate with her client, and to allocate decision-making about
settlement to the client.30 8  The LON lawyer's conduct is also consistent
with federal and state court rules about open, timely and efficient
discovery.30 9
The point in providing another example of LON lawyering that looks
to many lawyers like standard-issue good lawyering is to emphasize that
lawyering from faith is not necessarily the chimera that the Dominant View
understands it to be. When we move from the question of whether or not
lawyers should be informed by faith to the question of how, we are able to
scrutinize worries of lawyer dominance or disengagement in a more
discriminating way. Thus far, love of neighbor provides an example of
faith-based lawyering that rejects dominance, and rejects disengagement
because of difference.310 Instead, it offers an example of lawyering very
open to, and respectful of, client perspectives and autonomy, of lawyering
engaged in learning all of the relevant perspectives, and of lawyering
305. Compare GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 17 (requiring the conciliation of quarrels), with
Minow, supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing the dangers of bringing one's religious
values to their law practice).
306. I acknowledge the important influence for me of Robert Cover's writings on violence in
the law. See, e.g., Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). Thus, I
understand that filing a lawsuit may constitute a kind of violence that is antithetical to my
Buddhist training and to the idea of love of neighbor. Nonetheless, I also acknowledge the legal
system to be a legitimate place of dispute resolution, and one in which the parties and their
counsel have substantial abilities to mitigate the violence that may occur.
307. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 17.
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983) (discussing the allocation of
settlement decisions to the client); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983)
(calling on the lawyer to be diligent in her representation); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.4 (requiring the lawyer to communicate with the client so that the client is
informed about the representation).
309. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26; COLO. R. Cfv. P. 16.




C. BUT, WHAT IF...?
One can envision a circumstance in which a lawyer and her client
may, after an engaged conversation, disagree about a course of conduct.
For example, here the client may be very angry at the roofing company and
may decide that for her it is more important to file a lawsuit, than to accept
a settlement offer that she finds agreeable because she hopes that a lawsuit
will embarrass the roofing company. The lawyer may disagree - either
because she does not agree that embarrassment is an appropriate goal, or
because she does not believe that filing a lawsuit will meet the client's
hopes. Would a Dominant View lawyer and an LON lawyer behave
differently with the client? This article concludes yes, but possibly not in
the way predicted by the Dominant View.312
Under the Dominant View, so long as filing a lawsuit was not
frivolous and would not violate relevant court pleading rules or rules of
professional conduct,313 the lawyer should accede to the client's wishes to
file the lawsuit instead of settle.314 The Dominant View would put the
client's autonomy ahead of the lawyer's assessments.35  The Dominant
View lawyer may certainly have shared her assessment with the client that
filing a lawsuit might not embarrass the roofing company as the client had
hoped, but the Dominant View lawyer would not press the client further.31 6
The LON lawyer would be more engaged with her client.317 The
LON lawyer would have an explicit conversation about the client's wish to
embarrass the roofing company.3"8 But, importantly, the lawyer would
come with an intent to be open, to listen without judging, and to respond
with humility and compassion.319 So, the LON lawyer might inquire of the
client why embarrassment is important to her. Maybe the client just feels
vindictive. Maybe the client was referred to the roofing company by a
311. See id. at 17-19.
312. See SIMON, supra note 41, at 7-9 (summarizing the Dominant View theory of legal
ethics).
313. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) (requiring legal claims to be warranted and factual claims
to have evidentiary support); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (stating that a
lawyer shall not file a frivolous lawsuit).
314. See SIMON, supra note 41, at 7.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 26.
317. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 19.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 17.
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neighbor and has learned that the neighbor, and the neighbor's friend had
similar problems with the company, so the client wants to protect others.
Whatever the reason, the LON lawyer's engaged conversation explicitly
acknowledges the client as a moral actor, and encourages the client to
attend to the moral valence of her actions.32° By doing so, the LON lawyer
is not trying to badger the client into any particular conduct, but is instead
trying to create space for the Shafferian good man.321 In the end, the
decision remains the client's.
The intent of an LON lawyer described above challenges the
Dominant View's presumption of bad man lawyering. By cultivating LON
intent, a lawyer may resist self-interested or dominating behavior. A
lawyer also resists presuming a bad man client. As David Luban has noted,
sometimes cognitive distortions can miscue a person's judgment, and what
might appear as bad man behavior is behavior that is based on faulty
cognitive processes.322 The lawyer who is unwilling to have an explicit
conversation with a client about all the bases of the client's judgment call
(moral or otherwise) will be unable to differentiate between the badly-
motivated client and the well-motivated client who has misperceived the
situation.323 The lawyer may wrongly assume a badly-motivated client and
miss an easy opportunity to help a misperceiving client correct her
cognitive errors.324
Nonetheless, assume the roofing client decides to go forward with the
lawsuit solely for sport. The client tells the lawyer she feels like toying
with the roofing company because she can, and has no other reason for
going forward.3 2' That client is the archetypical bad man, and the kind of
client that the Dominant View holds up as the test case for protecting client
320. See id. at 20.
321. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 41 U. Prt-r. L. REV. 181,
182-224(1981).
322. See LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 101, at 111.7-8. In both articles,
Luban discusses cognitive distortions like dissonance and group polarization as factors that
account for bad judgment in which bad intent is not present. See also David Luban, The
Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1449 (2008)
("Furthermore, even if the client's value system finds nothing wrong with the tactic, that may be
the result of cognitive distortions ... rather than a fundamentally different moral outlook.").
323. See LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 101, at 111.7-8.
324. As David Luban has described it: "In cases where the client's decision results from
cognitive distortion rather than a genuinely different moral code, moral acquiescence on the
lawyer's part will reinforce the distortion, while moral activism may break the spell .. " Id.
325. In my experience (and, I expect, in most lawyers' experiences), such a client is
exceedingly rare. In fact, in my almost twenty years of experience between corporate litigation,
legal aid, and clinical work, I have never had such a client.
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autonomy.3 26 It is also the kind of client that the Dominant View believes
lawyers of faith cannot respect.327
In fact, the LON lawyer commits to respecting her client, regardless
of the client's motives. What the LON lawyer does not commit to is acting
as the client's representative if the client's motivations are inconsistent
with the lawyer's commitment to actions in line with the principles of love
of neighbor. In the roofing case, then, the LON lawyer may have a candid,
respectful conversation with the client about the fact the lawyer will not be
the client's attorney should she go forward with the lawsuit. 32 ' The
conversation will be without opprobrium or ultimatums.329 The LON
lawyer will continue the conversation to go over the client's options - how
the client might find another lawyer, whether the LON lawyer might
recommend new counsel, whether the client wishes to reconsider, and the
like.
Importantly, the client should not be surprised by the LON lawyer's
decision not to represent her in the roofing suit. The LON lawyer will have
been transparent throughout her interactions with the client about the
lawyer's commitment to a certain kind of lawyering, and will have
modeled LON lawyering behavior throughout. 330 Thus, the client will have
had concrete examples of what kind of lawyer the client was working
with.33' Finally, the LON lawyer will have engaged the client in moral
conversation in a way that ensures the client understands herself to be fully
participating in the conversation.332 The client will have maintained her
sense of being the final decision-maker about her own conduct.333




330. See Robert K. Vischer, Moral Engagement Without the "Moral Law": A Post-Canons
View ofAttorneys'Moral Accountability, J. OF THE PROF'L LAWYER 213, 222 (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pubs/vischer.pdf.
331. See id. (discussing the importance of a lawyer being overt about moral conversation, yet
doing so in a way that preserves client decision making).
332. See id.
333. Cf id. I acknowledge that the client's ability to find new counsel is more challenging in
those cases where the client has less access to lawyers, generally. See Nina W. Tarr, Ethics,
Internal Law School Clinics, and Training the Next Generation of Poverty Lawyers, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 10 11, 1028 n.60 (2009). For example, clients who live in rural areas where
lawyers are scarce, or clients who are low income, or who have small cases that may not be
financially attractive to lawyers. See id. However, that is not a problem unique to LON lawyers,
but presents a challenge to any kind of lawyering other than the strongest vision of Dominant
View lawyering. See generally W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients - The Moral
Autonomy of the Second-to-last Lawyer in Town, 48 UNIV. KAN. L. REv. 977 (2000) (describing
the last lawyer in town challenge for lawyer autonomy in client choice). Interestingly, those who
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The actions described above have not referred to any particular faith
tradition because the commonalities between the three faith traditions
considered in this article are very strong.334 Thus, the LON lawyer
described could come from Christianity, Judaism or Buddhism.33 5
Furthermore, the LON lawyer would be well regarded by the legal
profession as diligent, competent, and a good communicator.336 While the
Dominant View would not likely agree with the way in which the LON
lawyer engaged in moral conversation nor the LON lawyer's decision not
to go forward with representing the client, the Dominant View's fears of
attorney domination and disengagement are unfounded.337 The how of
faith-based lawyering that one sees from love of neighbor demonstrates the
importance and benefit of looking at a particular facet of faith-based
lawyering.:I
D. A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE?
One point should be developed further - that LON lawyering looks
very similar to good secular, humanist lawyering. In making that
comparison, the article is not implicitly arguing that LON lawyering is
good lawyering because it is the same as secular lawyering. For an LON
lawyer, the purpose of looking to love of neighbor as a guide is to
transform. For example, a Buddhist commits herself to the Eightfold Path
as a way of transforming herself, and as a way of engaging in the world so
that others might see the possibility of transformation in her actions.339 An
LON lawyer's reasons for acting are different than those of a secular
lawyer.
Furthermore, as Dr. King repeatedly reminded those with whom he
spoke, love in action has an internal component - an intent.3 40 Thus, LON
worry about the last lawyer in town problem often focus on the challenges faced by those putting
forward unpopular or controversial legal claims. See id. at 984. But, at least in the United States
with its fairly robust cause lawyering community, the clients with unpopular or controversial
causes may have an easier time finding a lawyer than would the hypothetical roofing client of this
article. See KEVIN R. DEN DULK, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 304 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., Stanford Univ. Press, 2006).
334. See LESNICK,supra note 183, at 23.
335. See id.
336. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3-4 (2008) (rule 1.3 calls on the lawyer to
be diligent in her representation, and Rule 1.4 requires the lawyer to communicate with the client
so that the client is informed about the representation).
337. See ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, supra note 102, at 28-30.
338. See Vischer, supra note 108, at 428-31 (emphasis added).
339. See SMITH & NOVAK, supra note 229, at 50.
340. See TOH, supra note 4, at 13.
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lawyering requires a specific intent.34' Without the requisite intent, an
LON lawyer is not meeting an essential criteria of love of neighbor.342 For
an LON lawyer, the fact that her outward behavior looks like good
lawyering is insufficient.343 The LON lawyer is also charged with
cultivating intent.3" While it may be enough for a non-LON lawyer to
outwardly behave in a certain way, an LON lawyer must do more.345 Thus,
to say that LON lawyering is good lawyering because it looks just like
good secular lawyering is to misunderstand a fundamental point of LON
lawyering.
E. A CRITIQUE: LOVE OF NEIGHBOR IS Too EASY AN EXAMPLE
One critique from those who are skeptical about the appropriateness
of faith-based lawyering might be that love of neighbor is too easy an
example.346 In other words, love of neighbor is so capacious in the conduct
it might encompass that it does not raise the possibility for lawyer
domination or disengagement of which the Dominant View is concerned.347
Love of neighbor is capacious in the sense that Samuel Levine has
noted.348  There is much specific conduct that is unenumerated, but
contained within the concept of love of neighbor. 349 Nonetheless, love of
neighbor as considered in Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism is bounded
by four concrete dimensions.35° It is other-regarding, it is inclusive and
universal, it is intentional, and it requires active conduct. 35 ' Those four
dimensions provide clear sorting mechanisms for conduct that is within
love of neighbor and conduct without. 52 It is not the case that love of
neighbor can be made to accommodate any lawyerly conduct.
353
Consider again the roofing company example. In describing the
initial client meeting, the article suggested that it would be inconsistent
with love of neighbor for a lawyer to set aside insufficient time for the
341. See id.
342. Cf id.
343. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 16.
344. See id. at 16-17.
345. See id. at 16.
346. See id.
347. See Ethical Obligations, supra note 215, at 187-89.
348. See Broad Life, supra note 215, at 1207-08.
349. See Ethics Codes, supra note 215, at 549, 571-72; see also Unenumerated Rights, supra
note 215, at 525; Ethical Obligations, supra note 215, at 187-88.
350. See TOH,supra note 4, at 13.
351. See id.
352. See supra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part IV.
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meeting. A lawyer who did so would not be other-regarding, and would
likely send a message to the new client that the client's time and interests
were less important than the lawyer's.354 But, nothing in the Rules of
Professional Conduct penalizes a lawyer for failing to be other-regarding in
setting the initial meeting.355
Or, consider the somewhat recent trend of bar associations and courts
propounding civility codes for lawyers.356 The civility codes usually call
for lawyers to show basic courtesies to each other, the court and litigants.357
The codes do not require a specific intent, merely conduct.358 Thus, a
lawyer, while being courteous, is free to silently think discourteous
thoughts.359 As noted above, that is not true for an LON lawyer, for whom
intent is as important as outward conduct. 360 An LON lawyer fails to meet
her responsibilities if her conduct is respectful, but her thoughts are not.361
As the two examples demonstrate, love of neighbor can guide lawyerly
practice in a way that is different from the current professional baseline, but
that need not be antithetical to that baseline.
By offering love of neighbor as an example of faith-based lawyering
that is good lawyering, the article has tried to be conscientious about
remaining in the particulars.362 In order to continue to move beyond the
existing dichotomous conversation, remaining in the particulars is
important. It ensures that the analysis is not overbroad, while also ensuring
that conclusions are not inappropriately generalized.
V. CONCLUSION
Return to the annual meeting of the Young Lawyers Division, where
the audience listens to the speaker conclude his remarks about love in
action as a lawyerly practice. There may have been some in the audience
who will have left as soon as the speaker began investigating the interplay
354. See supra p. 38.
355. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2008).
356. See L. Timothy Perrin, Lawyer as Peacemaker: A Christian Response to Rambo
Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 525 (2005). For a list of local bar associations that have adopted
civility codes, see American Bar Association,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/profcodes.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
357. See Perrin, supra note 356, at 525.
358. See generally ABA Section of Family Law, CIVILITY STANDARDS (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards-civility.pdf.
359. See supra p. 48 and note 345.
360. See supra Part IV.A.
361. See supra pp. 47-48 and notes 341-43.
362. See supra Part 1V.B.
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between lawyering and a religious value.363 For them, the Dominant View
triumphs and there can be nothing but problems when a lawyer considers a
religious value when deciding how to lawyer. 364 Even if they knew the
speaker's words were those of Martin Luther King, Jr., they remain
unwilling to consider the lessons provided by Dr. King, the preacher.365
Others in the audience have remained - some more from courtesy than
interest; some intrigued by, but maybe skeptical of, the idea that the legal
profession could be motivated by a concept such as love in action.366
By the end of the speaker's remarks, the audience leaves the
auditorium with some shared thoughts. The Dominant View of lawyering
is able to conceive of only one way for a lawyer to be able to respect client
autonomy and freedom of thought.3 67 That way is for a lawyer to remain
removed from her client - partisan to the client's goals, but unaccountable
for the client's moral choices. There is another way to envision lawyerly
practice, and that is through the unexpected lens of love in action or love of
neighbor.368 By considering lawyerly practice through that particular value,
one discovers a way in which lawyer and client both may deeply and
genuinely engage with each other.369 The lawyer commits to a practice that
accepts the client as she presents herself and her legal problem, but that
also accepts the client as having the capacity for moral conversation.37 °
The practice further commits the lawyer to an internal intent of equanimity
for all, and external action consistent with that. By the end of the remarks,
the audience may have a sense that they could be as inspired by Martin
Luther King, Jr., the preacher, as they are by Martin Luther King, Jr., the
civil rights hero.371
363. See supra pp. 4-5 and note 28.
364. See supra p. 11 and note 72.
365. See supra Part I.
366. See supra p. 4 and note 21.
367. See supra p. 7 and note 41.
368. See supra p. 20 and note 132.
369. See supra Part IV.
370. See supra p. 46 and note 332.
371. See supra Part I.
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